


THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

31 August 1977



N-20
16 Aug 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

FROM : O/D/DCI/NI

SUBJECT : Letter from Frank R. Barnett on "NATO's Vulnerability"

1. Action recommended: Signature on the attached reply to Frank Barnett.

2. Barnett is preaching to his choir. His point of view (and theirs) is legitimate and deserves expression. But it is neither the necessary nor a sufficient estimate of the East-West situation. Essentially it begins with a very gloomy, virtually "last ditch" assessment and proposes a renewed, only more vigorous and more effective, Western cold-war offensive, accompanied, to be sure, by improved military preparedness for purposes of deterrence.

3. He says that his organization (or a rhetorical "us", his wording is ambiguous) is being urged to sponsor a "larger conference" on various themes related to NATO vulnerability in late 1978 on the eve of NATO's 30th anniversary. Shades of the National Strategy Seminars of the Sixties! In requesting your views he seems to be soliciting an endorsement, I certainly do not believe you should send him anything he can quote. The attached letter for your signature has been written with this caveat in mind.



Attachment

STAT

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

N-20

SUBJECT: Letter from Frank R. Barnett on "NATO's
Vulnerability"

Distribution:

Orig. - DCI

1 - A/DDCI

1 - ER

1 - D/DCI/NI

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1 - Chrono (O/D/DCI/NI)

STAT

O/D/DCI/NI pam: (29 August 1977)

Washington, D. C. 20505

Exemption Recipient

7-1-8769/PA

8 September 1977

Dear Frank,


I have read your letter on NATO's vulnerability with interest. The conference report you enclosed contains much with which I might agree, much with which I might concur if differently stated, but also not a few observations I could not support. This is to be expected. As for the proposal that another such conference should be held next year, on a larger scale, I can readily conceive that it could be a useful project, provided there is sufficient interest. In principle, in my private capacity, I am heartily in favor of initiatives aimed at a wider and better understanding of international security problems -- from a variety of viewpoints. You must understand, though, that in my public capacity I cannot endorse any project that might be interpreted as an effort to influence American opinion in a particular direction.


Yours,


STANSFIELD TURNER

Frank R. Barnett
President
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
111 East 58th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

Washington, D. C. 20505



Dear Frank,

I have read your letter on NATO's vulnerability with interest. The conference report you enclosed contains much with which I might agree, much with which I might concur if differently stated, but also not a few observations I could not support. This is to be expected. As for the proposal that another such conference should be held next year, on a larger scale, I can readily conceive that it could be a useful project, provided there is sufficient interest. In principle, in my private capacity, I am heartily in favor of initiatives aimed at a wider and better understanding of international security problems -- from a variety of viewpoints. You must understand, though, that in my public capacity I cannot endorse any project that might be interpreted as an effort to influence American opinion in a particular direction.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Frank R. Barnett
President
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
111 East 58th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

Letter to Frank R. Barnett

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

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1 - ER

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1 - A/D/DCI/NI

1 - Registry

1 - Chrono

STAT

STAT

O/D/DCI/NI (29 August 1977)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001000340001-6

8 September 1977

Dear Frank,

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National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
111 East 58th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

N-20

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001000340001-6

ER file
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001000340001-6

6 September 1977

NOTE FOR: Admiral Turner

STAT

The day after I bucked this letter from Frank Barnett to the NIO to develop a response/ acknowledgment, I found the identical letter addressed to me at home. Frank, whom I have known since Wabash days (1942-43), is the most prolific pamphleteer on the private national security front. I am sure that many others in town received the same mailing with the same personalized closing -- "We'd appreciate your views." I have discussed this with Jim [redacted] and we see no problem in your signing off on the enclosed letter which is noncommittal and "non-quotable."

[redacted]
B. C. Evans

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Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001000340001-6

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Hamann and Jennings)
DOROTHY E. NICOLosi
Assistant Secretary and
Assistant Treasurer

111 EAST 58TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022
AREA CODE 212 838-2912

15 August 1977

Mr. Benjamin C. Evans, Jr.

Dear Ben:

NATO's vulnerability to Eurocommunism and/or
a "Resource War" in Africa & The Persian Gulf?

Is it possible that Moscow's geopolitical strategy may be designed to seal off mineral-rich Africa from the northern hemisphere with a low visibility "Resource War?" If so, France's recent interventions in Zaire and Chad -- plus President Carter's readiness to supply arms to friendly African states -- may frustrate Soviet initiatives, especially if public opinion support can be mustered.

Last winter, in England, we organized a multi-national Conference to consider the competition of "Czarist Navy and Cuban Gurkhas", plus collateral dangers to NATO and Japan. A Summary of the discussion is enclosed. (Among others present were General Al Haig, Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe, Admiral Noel Gaylor, European lawmakers, admirals from England, Italy and Japan, together with publishers, businessmen and scholars.)

Time has not outdated our analysis and conclusions. Certainly the three issues of the Conference pervade today's media:

- #1. the scope of NATO's "raw materials flank" -- oil and minerals -- in Africa, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean;
- #2. the internal peril to NATO from Popular Front coalitions and "Eurocommunism";
- #3. the use of new technology and weapons by the West to redress the military balance, now tilting towards the Warsaw Pact Forces.

You may find it worthwhile to review specific proposals made by the delegates to innovate a forward defense of Western values and vital interests.

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
Dr. Roy Godson
Director
International Labor Program
Georgetown University

*Also Directors

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With best regards, I am

Faithfully,



Frank R. Barnett

Enc.(1)

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

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
Remarks:

Please develop DCI response.
 Executive Secretary

17 Aug.
 Date

3637 (5-77)

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NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022
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DOROTHY E. NICOLosi
Assistant Secretary and
Assistant Treasurer

16 August 1977

Adm. Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC.

Dear Stan:

NATO's vulnerability to Eurocommunism and/or
a "Resource War" in Africa & The Persian Gulf?

Is it possible that Moscow's geopolitical strategy may be designed to seal off mineral-rich Africa from the northern hemisphere with a low visibility "Resource War?" If so, France's recent interventions in Zaire and Chad -- plus President Carter's readiness to supply arms to friendly African states -- may frustrate Soviet initiatives, especially if public opinion support can be mustered.

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
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SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

Remarks:

I got an identical letter & sent mine to the DDI.

Executive Secretary

STAT

National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

77-4960

1730 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W., ■ SUITE #601 ■ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 ■ AREA CODE (202) 296-6406

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NATIONAL OFFICE:
111 East 58th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 838-2912

15 June 1977

SVEN F. KRAEMER
Program Director

DR. ROY GODSON
Research Associate
*Director, International
Labor Programs*
Georgetown University

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC.

Dear Stan:

Enclosed is NSIC's second annual analysis of the comparative defense expenditures of the U.S. and the USSR.

In far too many categories of weaponry -- from antisatellite systems to artillery tubes -- Russia's advantage is ominous. If these trends continue, and if we lose the "R&D race," Moscow will have options for pre-emptive attack in Europe, the conduct of limited or proxy wars in the third world and even a crippling nuclear first strike against the U.S.

Our study, conducted by eight highly qualified experts, makes suggestions for improvements and reform. For example, we need to reexamine the utility of our high-cost volunteer forces when it is clear that more funds must be directed to new technologies.

Finally, this study reminds us that Soviet military doctrine stresses surprise, deception, pre-emptive and massive attack on U.S. targets while adding to its own civilian defense. Thus, we confront a threat of quite a different magnitude than if we mistakenly assume the USSR is bound by reliance upon the so-called balance of terror strategy, a kind of mirror image of the U.S.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully,



Frank R. Barnett

Enc.(1)

EXHIBIT REGISTRY FILE

N-20

National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

ARMS, MEN AND MILITARY BUDGETS: ISSUES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978

A Summary

The second annual review of defense issues published by the National Strategy Information Center, Inc. presents a series of analyses written by eight recognized authorities in the field of defense. The individual chapters of the study focus on specific aspects of the growing Soviet military threat and on U.S. defense options. The chapters are summarized below.

Foreword

In addressing the issue: "What is our defense program for?", Eugene V. Rostow's Foreword to the study poses the problem of peace for a world in which all states have not abandoned predatory ambition. Rostow reviews the nature of the Soviet military buildup and cites examples of the fact that even during the "detente" period: "The number, scale and importance of international aggressions have increased dramatically since 1969 or 1970 -- aggressions supported in each case by the Soviet Union." He notes that: "Nuclear peace can hardly be considered a license for Soviet expansion by conventional means," and adds that: "We can no longer accept a situation in which we live by the rules of the (U.N.) Charter governing the international use of force while the Soviet Union and its proxies, satellites and allies violate those rules on a scale which becomes larger, more pervasive and more dangerous with every passing year."

Noting America's puzzling slowness to realize the purpose and implications of the evident Soviet drive for supremacy, Rostow warns that: "History is pitiless. It makes no allowance for nations, however civilized they may be, if they refuse to recognize the prevalence of predators and to protect themselves against attack."

Rostow urges the U.S. and its allies to work for the restoration of their deterrent strength, both nuclear and conventional, at the same time working for the restoration of the rule of international law. He concludes that "to stand by while our adversaries build their strength to substitute coercion for law would be to abandon our interests, and the law, as surely by indolence and fear as through military defeat."

Strategic Forces

In a chapter assessing strategic forces, Francis P. Hoerber describes stark current trends in which: "During the past year, it has become more nearly inevitable that the Soviet Union will achieve strategic

superiority by the mid-1980's. The opportunities for the United States to redress the balance have become more narrowly constrained."

On the Soviet side, the chapter details the "massive deployments on land, at sea, and in the air which can only add up to a Soviet drive for superiority, not parity." Soviet developments during the post SALT I period include: the deployment of several new strategic weapons systems, the development of next generation defensive and offensive systems, stepped up civil defense preparedness, industrial dispersion and hardening; proliferation of regional "gray area" nuclear systems; rapidly deployable ABM capabilities; and a continuation of military doctrines stressing offensive, war-winning capabilities. The chapter also describes the Soviet's growing "3rd strike" potential against U.S. strategic forces.

On the U.S. side, the chapter notes the absence of new deployments; the limited programs for a new sea-based missile and a new strategic submarine; limited development programs for two follow-on missiles; deactivation of the ABM site; debate over the cruise missile; and debate and delayed decisions on the deployment of a new strategic bomber.

The author discusses the effect of these developments and of the battle of perceived capabilities upon deterrence, and provides detailed assessments of prior SALT agreements, verification issues and possible options for SALT II, including unilateral U.S. options. As a means of giving notice of U.S. concern and as incentive for Soviet interest in serious arms control negotiations, the author sets forth rationales for stepped up development of Minuteman, Trident, B-1 systems, and of satellite attack and defense programs. The author recommends additional spending of \$2-3 billion per annum on such programs.

Navy and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces

A chapter by David B. Kassing on Navy and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces reviews the main ideas of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's recent book "Sea Power and the State" to frame a comprehensive discussion of Soviet naval forces. In reviewing the quantitative and qualitative transformation of the Soviet fleet -- including the navy and the militarily significant merchant, fishing and oceanographic fleets -- the chapter describes the active projection of Soviet naval power into areas critical to the U.S. and its allies and cites examples of increased Soviet gunboat diplomacy against Third World states. The analysis suggests that Gorshkov/Soviet discussions of resources in areas far from the Soviet Union (which is largely self-sufficient economically) indicate Soviet naval purposes directed more toward exploitation of Western economic vulnerabilities than to identify new economic potential for the USSR. At the same time it is pointed out that in the drive for command and control of the seas, Soviet doctrine and deployments emphasize swift first strikes, including tactical nuclear strikes, against U.S. naval forces.

The chapter reviews U.S. measures designed to protect Allied maritime interests and to deny quick Soviet naval victories. The author reviews the U.S. Navy's general purpose shipbuilding programs, and compares four alternative options including the NSC 5 Year Program. The chapter concludes with a review of Marine Corps issues, including personnel questions, amphibious assault roles and possible NATO contingencies.

Army and Air Force General Purpose Forces

In this chapter, William Schneider, Jr. reviews the strengthening of the Soviet forward attack positions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet modernization of the German Blitzkrieg doctrine focused on offensive operations and on the preeminence of surprise and pre-emption. These are contrasted with U.S. budgets, deployments and doctrines which fail to offset the military implications of the Soviet effort.

The chapter reviews current Soviet combined arms doctrines, weapons modernization and deployments designed to increase the attack capabilities of the Soviet shock forces in Europe while decreasing prior warning time for the Allies. Recent developments on the Soviet side include the deployment of extensive new river crossing equipment, deployment of self-propelled artillery, major increases in artillery pieces and tanks, improved Soviet field air defenses, improved Soviet airlift potential, and development of new high performance attack helicopter. These Soviet steps, plus Soviet preparation to fight chemical and tactical nuclear war, contrast with U.S. and Allied budget and force structure inadequacies, equipment shortfalls in active and in predispositioned stocks, reinforcement weaknesses, outdated air-support doctrines and unnecessary current industrial constraints on U.S. tank production.

The author urges thoroughgoing assessments of these problems and calls for modernization of existing equipment as an important priority in both the procurement and the research and development sectors. The author recommends an increase in the U.S. general purpose force expenditure growth rate to ten percent per annum for a five-year period, as well as improvements in force structure and mobilization capability, new personnel policies, and new procurement efforts focused on meeting European contingencies particularly in terms of armor, artillery, close air support and air superiority aircraft.

Military Research and Development

In this chapter, author Stephen J. Lukasik takes note of the long-term consequences of the U.S. disinvestment in R&D as contrasted with Soviet investment increases. The chapter notes that the Soviets are preparing to fight and to survive a far broader class of conflicts than the West and have directed their R&D programs accordingly.

Whereas the West does not prepare for chemical warfare, has downplayed ballistic missile defense and voices the view that nuclear war is unthinkable, the Soviets not only think about these matters, but clearly intend that their system survive and be able to dominate in a post attack period. At the same time the Soviets (even their ground forces) are methodically preparing to wage electronic warfare against the sophisticated electronic devices upon which we place overwhelming dependence for communication, navigation, surveillance, weapons guidance, etc. And in their naval planning, the Soviets, rather than copying U.S. systems, have moved to develop new anti-submarine measures, new aerodynamics and new propulsion systems against Allied naval forces.

Since technology is something in which the U.S. excels, the author urges the development of America's technology card in areas of technological opportunity such as space, ABM, tactical nuclear weapons, precision guided munitions, electronic warfare, remote piloted vehicles, semiconductors, lasers and optics. To strengthen such programs, the author urges the expansion of the U.S. technology base at a rate of 2% per annum.

Military Manpower

Steven L. Canby's chapter on "The Military Manpower Question: Voluntarism or Conscription?" addresses: "the real question of what is an appropriate system for an issue so fundamental as bearing arms and with so much potential for straining the social fabric? -- Cost effectiveness is but one criterion among many, which should also encompass broad ethical and social-political considerations." In considering what system might be most appropriate, the chapter provides an extensive review of criteria including military, economic, individual, social and technical. As a possible approach, the author suggests a sequential manpower system for different situations, moving from voluntarism in peacetime, through lottery without exemption for limited conflict, to selective service for possible national-level conflicts.

Intelligence

William T. Lee's chapter on "Intelligence: Some Issues of Performance" focuses on the consistent underestimation of Soviet defense expenditures by the U.S. intelligence community. Lee is a former CIA official whose expanded study of this subject was recently published, along with relevant additional materials, by the National Strategy Information Center.

Lee's chapter outlines conspicuous failures in U.S. intelligence analyses of the Soviet economy (particularly defense spending), Soviet military doctrine and strategy, and Soviet political-military objectives. Lee reviews the main trends in Soviet national priorities and defense spending, including evidence drawn from the current Soviet Five Year Plan. Lee notes that "since 1958, the Soviets have doubled the share of their GNP devoted to defense, while the United States has reduced its share by nearly 50 percent. Since 1969, when SAA
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when SAA
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more than 50 percent, both absolutely and as a share of Soviet GNP.

Lee concludes that Soviet defense expenditures have grown at the annual rate of 10% in the period 1958-1970 and at 8-10% in the period 1971-1975, while the share of Soviet GNP allocated to defense has climbed from 10-12% in 1970, to 15% in 1975, with a projected climb to 18% by 1980.

Lee focuses on both budgetary and methodological problems in his analysis of why the CIA recently doubled its estimates of Soviet defense expenditures and why its prior estimates of the threat have been consistently understated. Lee notes, for example, a mirror image problem derived from American preoccupation with our own concepts and a fundamental failure to take into account basic asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet strategic concepts and doctrine. The author concludes with a number of specific recommendations on improving current and future U.S. intelligence studies and estimates.

Command and Control

In this chapter, Donald G. Brennan reviews major command and control issues in their relation to current Soviet doctrines and threats, and to related strategic issues including launch-on-warning modes, fail-safe modes, theater nuclear issues and communications security. Brennan also discusses these issues as they relate to specific command and control organizations and programs including the National Military Command System, Project Seafarer (for communication with U.S. submarines), and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

Brennan argues that Command and Control is one of the most important, if often neglected, aspects of national security affairs and that money spent on this area is often several times as effective as money spent on the military forces themselves insofar as command and control capabilities determine not only the effectiveness, but also the limits of the political and other basic national purposes for which military forces may be used.

Summary and Conclusions

Among the study's conclusions is that a proposed increase in constant dollar outlay's of 10% per annum for the next three years and of 5% per annum for seven additional years, would imply only a minor increase in the economic burden of defense in the context of a growing U.S. economy, but would make it possible for the United States to redress the dangerous military imbalance arising between the US and the USSR.

/ / / / /

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
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15 June 1977

SVEN F. KRAEMER
Program Director

DR. ROY GODSON
Research Associate
Director, International
Labor Programs
Georgetown University

Mr. Benjamin C. Evans, Jr.
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC.

Dear Ben:

Enclosed is NSIC's second annual analysis of the comparative defense expenditures of the U.S. and the USSR.

In far too many categories of weaponry -- from antisatellite systems to artillery tubes -- Russia's advantage is ominous. If these trends continue, and if we lose the "R&D race," Moscow will have options for pre-emptive attack in Europe, the conduct of limited or proxy wars in the third world and even a crippling nuclear first strike against the U.S.

Our study, conducted by eight highly qualified experts, makes suggestions for improvements and reform. For example, we need to reexamine the utility of our high-cost volunteer forces when it is clear that more funds must be directed to new technologies.

Finally, this study reminds us that Soviet military doctrine stresses surprise, deception, pre-emptive and massive attack on U.S. targets while adding to its own civilian defense. Thus, we confront a threat of quite a different magnitude than if we mistakenly assume the USSR is bound by reliance upon the so-called balance of terror strategy, a kind of mirror image of the U.S.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully,

Frank R. Barnett

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STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

ARMS, MEN, AND MILITARY BUDGETS

Issues for Fiscal Year 1978


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25 May 1977

Mr. Frank R. Barnett
President
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
111 East 58th Street
New York, New York 10022

Dear Frank:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the W. T. Lee pamphlet setting forth his approach to the analysis of Soviet defense expenditures and his understanding of ours. I regret the delay in my response; I wanted my staff to report to me in depth on the issues involved.

As you are no doubt aware, the differences between the two approaches have been extensively discussed both publicly and privately. Most recently, Mr. Lee was invited to discuss his approach with the members of my Military-Economic Advisory Panel. As a result, while there is by no means complete agreement, the deficiencies and limitations of the various approaches are by now fairly well understood. This is a very difficult area of analysis, and no one has a monopoly on truth. Thus, while Lee's assessment is quite different from ours, it does not seem inappropriate to bring an alternative view to the attention of the public.

On the other hand, we believe that within the limits of what is measurable, our present estimates in this area are probably as good as the available methodologies and tenuous evidence permit. We are constantly striving to improve these estimates; as new information becomes available and new techniques are developed, we shall continue to revise them as we have in the past. We do not, however, believe that Lee's data and approach provide a basis for better judgments.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

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